

DRINA CORPS COMMAND

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Situation on the territory in the zone of
responsibility of the Drina Corps

1. Zvornik lpbr /light infantry brigade/:

It is organised based on a territorial principle and now has eight battalions, headquarters support units and other units. Pursuant to payroll records, the numerical strength is 5,405 soldiers.

There are 13 active officers and 10 junior officers in this brigade, who should be urgently reassigned to other units of the RS /Republika Srpska/ Army due to unsatisfactory performance and not obeying the Corps Command when completing combat operations: Lieutenant Colonel Milutin BOSANČIĆ, Lieutenant Colonel Slobodan VASILIĆ, Captain 1st Class Dragan JOKIĆ, Lieutenant Branko STUDEN and Lieutenant Lazar PEJIĆ.

With the arrival of paramilitary organisations to the Zvornik municipality, particularly the arrival of Arkan and his people, this territory was liberated from the Turks. Turks made up 60% of the municipality's population and it has now been cleansed and replaced with an ethnically pure Serb population. It is one of the wealthiest municipalities in the SR /Serbian Republic/ and has become the target for all kinds of

thieves in this war: Niški, Pivarski, Kameni, Sima, aka “Četnik”, and others are here. In addition to them, we have people from Serbia who provided assistance in the early stages of the war: Marko PAVLOVIĆ from the Serbian MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, whose real name is allegedly Branko POPOVIĆ; Čeda KOJIĆ, the chief of the Loznica MUP; Slobodan MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, a psychologist from the OC /operations centre/ in Vršac; Colonel TAČIĆ, the OC commander in Vršac, and others. All of these individuals wish to exert their influence over Zvornik through a number of people in Zvornik. The president of the municipality was close to all those who were working on the sidelines during the initial period of the war and he shared war booty with them. Today he is allegedly with the SR Army and gives it verbal support, while at the same time saying that the officers are incapable of leading the army.

A large number of Serbs have moved into the area of the Zvornik municipality and are under the command of the army. These are second-class citizens because they have no rights even though they and their units are continuously being sent to complete the most difficult combat tasks.

Platoon, company, battery and battalion units have been formed to defend hamlets, villages and local communes and this was not done according to the principle of military organisation. The attempts made thus far by the Corps Command to restructure the units according to the principles of military organisation have not yielded results. Local (village and municipal) leaders and the directors of leading enterprises in Zvornik are forcefully resisting these attempts.

The population – combatants (80%) are not ready and they do not want to conduct military operations outside of the territory of their hamlets and villages. We currently have /?around 200 soldiers/ in this brigade who want to fight throughout the whole municipal territory and outside of the territory.

In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to take the following measures:

- remove those officers who present a problem for the brigade;
- form two light pbr /infantry brigades/ with a battalion composition out of the current brigade since manpower is available and current organisation is favourable;
- bring back 59 Serb officers who are from the territory of the Zvornik municipality and who are living and working in the FRY /Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ Army.
- form units according to military organisation and not according to the principle of hamlet – village – local commune, even if it means losing specific territory within the Zvornik municipality,
- exert influence through the SR Presidency to remove organs of authority, and have the MUP organs deal with those policemen who are the town's thorough thieves.

2. Bratunac lpbr:

The brigade has 2,295 soldiers on its payroll, of whom four are officers and one is an active junior officer. Two officers are battalion commanders, one is a brigade

commander and one is a chief of staff (he was a signaller in the navy and cannot be used to carry out these duties).

The problems in this brigade are as follows:

- 80% of the militarily-fit and active Serb population has fled to the FRY;
- the remainder of the population that is fighting in the brigade only takes part in the defence of their own village and would only leave that territory if they knew that they could successfully obtain loot;
- there are a number of paramilitary formations in the zone of responsibility of the brigade that are only there to loot;
- there is a conflict between the Bratunac and Srebrenica Serbian municipality (which is now on the territory of Bratunac) and between the mine and its director, who is from the territory of the Srebrenica municipality,
- donors from abroad and from within the country are generously offering their financial help and asking in return that their villages be given additional protection;
- the *SASE* mine is defending itself with a large quantity of manpower and materiel. Even though it was attacked several times, it managed to withstand the attacks. However, in the last attack on 16 and 17 December 1992, the mine was abandoned practically without a fight. The director of the mine gave separate funds as an incentive to the soldiers who defended the mine, which had a negative impact on the other soldiers.

3. Birčani pbr /infantry brigade/:

According to payroll records, there are 6,054 soldiers here, and according to establishment, there are 3,505 soldiers. The current brigade is enormous and covers a large zone of responsibility. The brigade command is unable to have RiK /command and control/ over all of the units.

Considering the current situation, we propose the following:

1. Form two brigades out of the current brigade as follows:

- a) the Birčani pbr is to become an infantry brigade as per establishment, and replenished from the Šeković municipality (there are currently four battalions and other necessary units there),
- b) the Milić lpbr is to become an infantry brigade as per establishment and have a battalion composition. It is to be replenished and formed out of the Vlasenica and Milić municipalities (according to establishment there are now three infantry battalions and there is manpower to form the other units); a minor problem would be how to appoint the brigade command and brigade commander.

Problems encountered by the brigade:

- a large zone of responsibility for the brigade,
- an extended line of defence with the frontline facing Kalesija, Olovo, Cerska, Konjević Polje, Srebrenica and Žepa.
- heavy influence by local leaders over the municipality, especially by the director of the labour organisations, and significant influence by the director of the bauxite mine in Milići, Rajko DUKIĆ, on military organisation in Milići and Vlasenica in terms of issuing tasks to units and problems with personnel,
- the battalions that are formed in the Milići municipality are done so on the principle of village units and we have numerous instances of individuals leaving

the frontline. In addition, they do not want to attack outside of their villages, much less their municipalities.

- overall in the whole brigade (despite significant losses thus far) there is a feeling of a lack of responsibility when it comes to the battalion, company and platoon commands and soldiers completing tasks (for example: fortifications – covers and shelters; reconnaissance, reconnaissance of sabotage operations behind enemy lines; large uncovered gaps and minefields being set in an unorganised fashion, ambushes, patrols and similar).

4. 1st plpbr /Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade/ (Rogatica):

The numerical strength of the brigade according to payroll records is 2,722. The brigade is formed according to the principle of village units and it has organised its defence according to the principle of defending hamlets and villages, and does this only within the municipality.

The brigade is led by a local *vojvoda* /military leader/ who has co-operated little or not at all within the corps, especially with respect to carrying out combat operations. Consequently, we had to postpone some operations or carry them out only partially. While he is carrying out the duties of brigade commander, we will not be able to move the brigade outside of the municipality. Based on manpower potential, the brigade can be formed based on standard wartime formation.

There is one officer in the brigade (a NŠ /chief of staff/ who integrated himself as brigade commander).

5. 2nd plpbr (Višegrad)

Its paid manpower is 1,020 soldiers and officers, out of whom three are officers (a commander and a NŠ, who are managing well overall in the KiK system of operations, and one junior officer).

This municipality has very limited manpower potential: new mobilisation of soldiers is modest.

The brigade is gradually reforming but is not able replenish with numerical strength based on standard wartime establishment so we will form only two battalions with the other necessary units (but with a reduced composition).

A part of the manpower has fled to Serbia and is located in the municipality of Priboj, and especially in the municipality of Užice. Since the manpower here (70%) does not want to fight outside of their own villages as its organisation now stands, it is necessary that we urgently set up a real formation of the units (squad, platoon, company, battalion) and have manpower join the operations at any cost.

Logistics support is more difficult.

6. 3rd plpbr (Čajniče):

The numerical strength of the brigade is 1,091 soldiers, and 741 per establishment, which means that the brigade can be formed according to standard wartime formation.

For the moment there are no problems in the brigade or the municipality with regard to the following: civilian – military authority; the MUP and the police are working pursuant to brigade requests; there are no unit desertions.

Problems in the brigade:

- lack of a brigade commander and brigade staff,
- there are no professional staff (active military personnel) that could form the brigade,
- the current brigade organisation is based on village units that are defending the village,
- there is significant resistance to transferring combat operations from the municipality of Čajniče to the Goražde municipality,
- for the moment, the KORNJAČA family is commanding the brigade and it will be very difficult to have the Drina Corps make this command carry out b/d /combat operations/ and have command and control over it,
- there is unskilled handling and use of artillery, which wastes a considerable amount of ammunition,
- difficulties in logistics support for the unit.

7. 4th plbr (Rudo):

According to records, it numbers 972 soldiers, and has the possibility of mobilising over 1,600 soldiers. Currently, the following exist and function in

the brigade: logistics organs and units; a military police platoon; a communications platoon; a headquarters administration command and a brigade command and 2 (two companies) on the front; there are a total of 350 soldiers and officers in the brigade.

The Rudo municipality has not experienced war on its territory (it had no destruction, and the losses that it did suffer were mainly due to careless work, fleeing and sleeping).

The Rudo municipality borders Priboj, where approximately 60% of people work in the Priboj FAP /automobile factory/ and are not at all interested in defending Rudo (the local communes of Mokronožani, Bijelo Brdo, Štrpci and Mioče, where 800 militarily-fit people are living and working).

In the remainder of the municipality, the population does not want to go into combat outside of their municipality and their behaviour is very cowardly. The brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ljubiša VUČKOVIĆ, was killed in this unit.

The brigade has been formed per establishment (except for logistics) and therefore it is not ready to carry out combat tasks.

In the municipality there is a certain conflict between the civilian and military authorities, as follows:

- the military section does not want to and is not doing its job, nor are their documents in order. The impression is that they do not want to mobilise manpower for combat and are constantly hiding behind certain decisions issued by the Ministry of National Defence.
- the members of the SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/, especially the republican deputy of the Rudo municipality, are considerably disrupting the work of the officers in the unit with their activities and conduct, and they do not want to take part in combat and are hiding their brothers and relatives from mobilisation, which has a negative effect on the rest of the population,
- the activities of the municipal authorities are not positively influencing mobilisation, nor helping raise the population's morale,
- war profiteers are present in the municipality,
- the police is not taking part in combat operations and are accepting individuals into the police who have connections,
- there is a large number of deserters both within and outside of the municipality,
- the civilian authorities are not taking measures against those people who refuse to respond to mobilisation,
- difficulties in the brigade's logistics support (the Bileća – Sokolac logistics base).

8. Skelani Independent Battalion:

The Serbian municipality of Skelani is the youngest and also the smallest municipality in SR. The problems of this municipality are soldiers continuously going to sleep in

Bajina Bašta. All this is caused by the first man of the municipality Dr /name redacted/, who returns to Bajina Bašta at nightfall, where he has an apartment at the Inex Hotel that is paid for by the Skelani municipality.

For many in Bajina Bašta, the Skelani municipality is like a relative and they want to safeguard this territory, but under no circumstances do they want to participate in combat.

There is significant aversion towards the Serbian army and the Supreme Command, and there is prevalent propaganda in Skelani that the president of the municipality is behind all this.

Together with the president of the municipality, a certain number of people have commenced regular criminal activity, justifying it by saying that they are supposedly paying for the procurement and shipping of b/s /combat equipment/ with that money.

There is no co-ordination between the MUP and the municipal authorities, which affects the general situation in the Skelani municipal area.

Based on payroll records, there are 251 soldiers in the Skelani battalion who are divided into three companies that only defend their own villages and are not holding any positions.

CONCLUSION:

In order to stabilise the situation in the corps's zone of responsibility, it is necessary to take the following measures:

1. Declare a state of war in the zone of responsibility and bring in a military administration (to prevent desertion from the units, to form units as per establishment, to stop war profiteers, donors and local officials and directors of work organisations from looting public property, and to ensure that all municipal organs take part in defence).
2. Immediately after the elections in the FRY, the Presidency of Republika Srpska must officially request that all militarily-fit (male) citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 return urgently to the municipality from where they fled (in case they do not respond, they are to be declared as deserters and should be taken in and their families should be refused all refugee rights and assistance through the Red Cross).
3. Have the Military Prosecutor's Office and the court begin working so that the appropriate repressive measures may be taken.
4. Have the Republika Srpska Assembly adopt a decision to seize all property and withhold citizen rights for those who do not return to RS.
5. Through the GŠ /Main Staff/ of the Yugoslav Army, all active officers on the territory of Republika Srpska are to be requested to come and take part in combat.
6. Units must be militarily organised even if it means temporarily losing certain territory (because the current organisation based on hamlets, villages and local communes will lead us to total disorientation and the complete loss of territory).

7. Prevent all possible paramilitary organisations from coming in to the corps's zone of activity and only accept volunteers under the single command of the units and the staffs of the RS Army.
8. Require members of the SDS party and deputies of the RS Assembly to join in the first combat lines and contribute to raising combat morale (instead of what has been happening thus far, which is that they are responsible for the unwillingness of the officer and command staff to work, they are avoiding their own military duties and allowing their family members and friends to avoid theirs).
9. Assist the Corps Command to form mixed artillery regiments and assault brigades that are to serve as manoeuvring forces in the corps's zone of responsibility in order to resolve combat problems and tasks.
10. Since the information system is not yet fully operational on the territory of Republika Srpska, it is necessary to form the Republika Srpska RTV /radio and television/ and enable all Serbs in the Republic to be able to watch it.
11. Replenish the Corps Command with officer staff (AVL /active servicemen/) who will not only be committed to defending an individual (local) area, but will consider the general and complete area of Republika Srpska.

CHIEF OF THE OONP /organ for operations and training/

Colonel

Miladin PRSTOJEVIĆ

/signed and stamped/