

MILITARY SECRET
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REPORT
OF THE GUARDS SERVICE NEAR THE BUILDING
OF THE 4th PB /infantry battalion/ VLASENICA

Vlasenica, June 1992

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Pursuant to Article 320 of the Rules of Service of the O/S/ /Armed Forces/, in order to provide security for the buildings of the Battalion Command, the camp barracks and the buildings in Sušica where the MTS /Materiel and Technical Equipment/ and prisoners of war are located, I hereby

O R D E R:

Reconnoitre the sector where the buildings are located and based on an appropriate inspection of the situation, draw up an ASSESSMENT of the dangers to the buildings and any immediate danger possibly caused by the condition of the buildings and the elements therein.

The assessment will be drawn up by the following expert staff organs:

1. Nešo JOVIĆ – Deputy Commander
2. Boško NASTIĆ – ONP /Operations and Training/ officer
3. Mile SARIĆ – Security officer
4. Mile SIMANIĆ – Intelligence officer
5. Savo ČELIKOVIĆ – PKP /Assistant Commander for Logistics/

The assessment will be an integral part of the security report and updated as the situation changes.

The security report will be compiled by the same commission in three copies, one of which will be sent to each of the following:

1. Battalion Commander
2. Guard Security
3. Battalion Command, as permanent work material

Work on the task must be started immediately and completed by 17 June 1992 at the latest.

C O M M A N D E R
M a j o r
Slobodan RAJIĆ
/signed and stamped/

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A S S E S S M E N T

THE DANGER TO BUILDINGS IN SUŠICA FROM ATTACK ON THEM AND TO THE UNITS FROM ATTACK FROM THEM

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The assessment of the danger to the buildings in Sušica must consider the following elements:

- the security situation in the general sector and the location of the buildings
- position of the buildings in relation to the populated area
- purpose of the buildings
- arrangement of individual elements within the building
- most economic method of providing security for the buildings
- which buildings are most sensitive and what must be done specifically
- distance from the buildings to the Battalion KM /Command Post/
- the need to prohibit taking recording devices and various other devices into the buildings
- regulating approach to the buildings, reception service, registration, visits and so on,
- possibility to maintain communications and
- other matters of interest for processing elements in the assessment.

The NVO /weapons and military equipment/ buildings in Sušica are owned by the Vlasenica OpŠTO /Municipal Territorial Defence Staff/, and now by the Serbian Army, intended for storage of NVO. The buildings are of architectural type S-20 and S-40. A guardhouse for accommodating the guard service was built next to them. They are located in the Sušica sector and, due to their importance, were observed and provided with KO /expansion unknown/ protection in the past too. The current security situation in the general sector is very complex because the buildings are located in an environment surrounded by Muslim population who vigilantly monitor every move around the buildings. In addition, the area around the buildings is wooded, thereby providing opportunity for DTA /sabotage and terrorist action/ infiltration into the close vicinity of the buildings. The building where the prisoners of war are accommodated, who have become a potential danger for our forces because they are located behind the backs of our forces, is making the specific security situation even more complex. Unidentified persons are becoming increasingly interested in the prisoners and attempts are made during visits to pass various items in food, and there have already been attempts to pass cold weapons.

Regarding their position, the buildings are unfavourably located in a ravine and surrounded by private houses and holiday cottages. Two roads lead to the buildings, both of which go from Vlasenica and from directions which are in the ravine and covered so that one can get to within 100 meters in a motor vehicle without being noticed.

As the area around the buildings is wooded, they are sensitive to fire. PPZ /fire prevention/ was done for that purpose, which meets only minimal requirements

because frequently there is no water. In addition, extinguishing a fire with water would be dangerous because a high-voltage electric power network runs across the building. According to PPZ regulations, for one building there is a sufficient number of fire extinguishers for initial fire fighting, while the second building which is only around 600 prisoners of war /as printed/.

The buildings are around 20 metres apart and surrounded by a barbed-wire fence up to two metres high which is very easily surmountable. Three trenches have been dug for physical protection from which the buildings can be fired at and defended at the same time, but fire /?would not/ be efficient in the wooded parts around the buildings.

Engineering support requires setting up additional fortification obstacles and anti-tank barriers, and digging the necessary number of covers-trenches from the inside and the outside, /?cutting down trees/.

Lockable swing gates must be installed on the access roads and they must have a guard posted by them or they must be opened by the existing guard posts-guards at request.

An internal security service must be organised with ten permanent guards working in shifts. During the night or as needed they would be reinforced with a police patrol numbering three or four men who would come around every two hours, and if necessary stay even longer. /word unknown/ of greater danger, the forces of a reinforced police platoon must be engaged /as printed/. A prison warden would have to be present all the time, pointing out mistakes and omissions of the guards service and constantly explaining to the prisoners their rights and obligations and regularly informing the relevant commands.

The buildings are around 800 metres from the barracks and separated by a wooded area and a town neighbourhood, which makes any intervention by the unit difficult and makes it easy for the prisoners to escape in various directions, given the fact that the Muslim forces in the town still have not been fully mopped up.

There is not much possibility to apply any electronic and technical devices. A protective anti-burglar audio signal connected to the SJB /public security station/ and battalion might possibly be installed, but it would be expensive and uneconomical.

In accordance with the Rules of Service of the OS /Armed Forces/, item 319, electrifying the wire fence and mining the sector is not allowed because this must be approved by an officer holding the army rank or higher /as printed/.

It is impossible to apply any disinformation or cover-up measures because it is a public place and everyone is practically informed both about the type of buildings and the number and structure of prisoners.

In order to prevent informing the public about the prisoners' appearance and the conditions they live in, any attempts to take recording devices and explosives inside or conduct interviews must be prevented, extensive movement must be prohibited and so on.

Visits of any type must be prohibited, particularly bringing food and other material to the prisoners.

Communication with the building can be maintained with a RV /radio communications/ and a PTT /post, telegraph, telephone/ link which is stationed inside the building, but interception is possible so they must be protected by using KZ /cryptographic data protection/ documents.

As a result of everything presented above, the conclusion is that the building is located in a very unfavourable position, particularly for accommodating prisoners, and we therefore advise the command and social structures to vacate it as soon as possible and relocate the prisoners to another sector, building or location where it is safer to provide security.

COMMISSION MEMBERS:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

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Pursuant to Article 322 of the Rules of Service of the OS and conclusions from the Assessment of the Degree of Threat Posed to the Buildings drawn up by the expert commission, in order to provide security for the buildings in Sušica, I hereby

O r d e r:

1. Immediately start fortifying the camp additionally by digging trenches and covers and setting up other fortification obstacles needed, and also clearing the woods, and upon approval /sentence incomplete/.
2. Appoint men for provision of physical security, comprising a permanent and unalterable unit numbering ten soldiers with modern automatic weapons.
3. See if it is possible, if necessary, to additionally illuminate the building.
4. Impose KO and other security measures through the security organ. Guard support must take measures involving self-protection, building vigilance, observing measures prescribed when using technical equipment and so on.
5. Put up warning signs in clearly visible spots, /sentence incomplete/.
6. Improve PPZ measures with additional water barrels and the necessary number of fire extinguishers for initial fire fighting.
7. Maintain constant communication with the battalion command and the Vlasenica SJB.
8. Compile a list of code signs for communication to protect calls.

COMMANDER
Major Slobodan PAJIĆ
/signed and stamped/

Attachment no. _____

L I S T
OF MEN ASSIGNED TO GUARD THE BUILDING
FOR ACCOMMODATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR IN SUŠICA

VARIANT	REGULAR SUPPORT	REINFORCED SUPPORT
	Milan NIKOLIĆ, Commander ✓	Regular support
I	1. Goran PEJINOVIĆ ✓✓ 2. Radenko KOVAČEVIĆ – VL /serviceman/ 3. Milisav DOŠIĆ - VL	VLASENICA SJB patrol with 3-4 policemen
	Milan NIKOLIĆ, Commander	
II	1. Goran TEŠIĆ ✓ VL 2. Milenko GOJGOLOVIĆ ✓ 3. Pero POPOVIĆ ✓	Regular support Vlasenica SJB patrol with 3-4 policemen
	Milan NIKOLIĆ, Commander	Regular support
III	1. Ljubinko ĐURIĆ - VL 2. Vučeta DROBNJAK ✓ V? 3. Rodoljub ĐURIĆ - VL	Vlasenica SJB patrol with 3-4 policemen

COMMANDER
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Attachment no. _____

Guard Support for the Building
for Accommodation of Prisoners of War in Sušica

Number	GUARD ELEMENTS	Type of Support	
		Regular	Reinforced
1.	<u>GUARD POSTS:</u>		
	- Permanent guards	3	6
	- Patrol	-	1
2.	<u>GUARD COMPOSITION:</u>		
	- Guard Commander	1	1
	- Permanent guards	3	6
3.	<u>WEAPONS:</u>		
	- pistols	3	3
	- automatic rifles	4	7
	- semi-automatic rifles	4	4
	- light machine guns	2	2
	- hand grenades	10	10
4.	<u>TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT</u>		
	- binoculars	1	1
	- flashlights	1	1
	- telephones	1	1
	- Ru /radio sets/ Rup /mobile radio sets/-33	1	1

COMMANDER
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DIRECTIVE

ON THE WORK OF GUARD SUPPORT

1. Guard support for KO buildings in Sušica is made up of 10 soldiers (commander of the guard and nine guards) working in shifts as permanent guard.
2. Regular support comprises commander of the guard and three guards, and for reinforced support, a SJB patrol with 3-4 policemen is called who occasionally or permanently provide security for the buildings.
3. IN THE EVENT OF DANGER OR ATTACK ON THE GUARD, URGENTLY inform superior command at telephone numbers 773/0-313, 730-825, 730-877, 730-559, firing short bursts from automatic weapons at the same time.
4. Urgently take defence positions in pairs using natural and artificial methods. Fire must be aimed at large groups of attackers for the purpose of efficiency.
5. Strangers and unidentified persons must not be allowed near the buildings, and no access must be allowed to the buildings in particular.
6. People must be brought out in smallest possible groups, not more than 5-10, escorted by two guards on the side, and moving in a column, 1-2 metres apart.
7. If guards are personally insulted, treatment of prisoners must be rougher than usual in regulations, and any mutual insults and arguments must be prevented, particularly those contrived for the purpose of /word unknown/ the guards and distraction from the main task.
8. Contact must be kept regularly, informing every two hours of the situation near the buildings by telephone or RV.
9. Regarding any unclear matters, contact the Prison Warden, Chief of the Vlasenica SJB and the 4th pb Vlasenica Command.
10. Regularly keep a guard log in an A-4 notebook, registering the following: observations by persons inspecting the guard, weapons received, unusual incidents, information on the persons making inspection, irregularities in service, report to a superior officer, information on transfer of duties and so on.

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D I R E C T I V E
FOR FIRE PREVENTION AND NATURAL DISASTERS

1. Full attention must be devoted to fire prevention as an element of self-protection.
2. Regular checks must be made to see if PPZ equipment is in proper working order.
3. In the event of fire, initial fires must be extinguished immediately with fire extinguishers, water and sand, and in the event of wide-spread fire, call the Vlasenica Fire Department at telephone number 93 or 731-224, and also inform the Battalion Command of the fire.
4. All available troops must be used for fire fighting, taking specifics into account in order to prevent men from using fire for escape.
5. In the event of natural disasters-floods and so on, in the initial stage a dam must be made from currently available material, and in the event of a large-scale natural disaster, inform the Battalion Command.

COMMANDER
Major Slobodan PAJIĆ
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